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1.  fNTRODUCTfON 
On  June  16,  1933,  President  Roosevelt  signed 
into  law  the  Banking  Act  of  1933,  Section  11  of 
which  specified  that  “No  bank  shall,  directly  or  in- 
directly,  hy  any  device  whatsoever,  pay  an  interest 
on  any  deposit  which  is  payable  on  demand.”  In 
spite  of  the  45  years  existence  of  the  law,  the  con- 
cept  of  an  “implicit”  demand  deposit  interest  rate 
paid  by  banks  to  their  depositors  is  used  with  in- 
creasing  frequency  by  economists  in  a  variety  of 
different  c0ntexts.l 
The  determinants  of  the  demand  for  money  have 
been  one  of  the  most  intensively  researched  issues  in 
economics.  The  well  known  IS-LM  model  of  the 
macroeconomics  literature  suggests  a  relationship  be- 
tween  the  effectiveness  of  monetary  and  fiscal  policy 
on  the  one  hand  and  the  nature  of  the  demand  for 
money  function  on  the  other.  Some  recent  work  in 
this  area  has  attached  central  importance  to  the  role 
of  the  implicit  deposit  rate  in  the  demand  for  money 
function  and,  in  the  process,  has  significantly  en- 
hanced  understanding  of both  the  nature  of  this  func- 
tion  and  its  implications  for  policy-making. 
The  use  of  the  concept  is  by  no  means  restricted 
to  money  demand  theory  and  its  implications  for 
macroeconomic  theory  and  policy.  How  efficient  is 
the  U.  S.  payments  system  and  to  what  extent  is 
that  efficiency  affected  by  the  prohibition?  If  the 
prohibition  were  relaxed  or  removed  entirely,  what 
would  be  the  effect  on  bank  costs  and  how  would 
this  effect  be transmitted  to  the  banks’  depositors  and 
borrowers  ?  Would  removing  the  prohibition  lead 
to  a profound  alteration  of the  competitive  position  of 
banks  vis&vis  non-bank  depository  institutions  such 
as  S&L’s  and  mutual  savings  banks? 
It  would  be  presumptuous  indeed  to  assert  that 
economists  have  arrived  at  anything  like  definitive 
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1 The  background  of  this  legislation  as  well  as  an  ap- 
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answers  to  these  questions.  But  it  is  manifest  that 
the  concept  of  an  implicit  deposit  rate  is  an  impor- 
tant  ingredient  in  securing  at  least  approximate 
answers.  The  extent  to  which  the  spirit,  if  not  the 
letter,  of  the  1933  Banking  Act  has  been  circum- 
vented  by  the  payment  of  an  implicit  deposit  rate 
affects,  in  a s.gnificant  way,  economists’  responses  to 
the  above  questions. 
The  next  section  of  this  article  examines  several 
approaches  to  the  measurement  of  the  implicit  de- 
posit  rate.  This  is followed  by  a  discussion  of  recent 
research  on  the  demand  for  money  function-research 
that  makes  extensive  use  of  the  implicit  deposit  rate 
concept.  Finally,  some  implications  of  the  substitu- 
tion  of  explicit  for  implicit  interest  payments  are 
examined.  The  development  of  the  NOW  account 
and  the  Federal  Reserve  Board’s  recent  proposal  to 
pay  interest  on  member  bank  reserves  are  two  dra- 
matic  examples  of  this  substitution.  The  article  con- 
cludes  with  a  discussion  of  some  limitations  of  the 
implicit  deposit  rate  concept. 
If.  MEASURES  OF  THE  fMPf.fCfT 
DEMAND  DEPOSfT  RATE 
As  administrators  of  the  nation’s  payments  mech- 
anism,  commercial  banks  provide  an  important  flow 
of  services  to  the  general  community.  The  provision 
of these  payments  services  is costly  both  to  the  bank- 
ing  system  and  to  society  because  real  resources  are 
allocated  to  their  production;  resources  that  have  an 
economic  opportunity  cost  measured  by  the  value  of 
the  other  goods  and  services  which  we  forego  in 
order  to produce  payments  services.  Yet  the  revenue 
that  a  bank  receives  from  these  services  is  rarely 
equal  to  the  cost  to  a  bank  of  providing  them. 
The  explanation  is  well  known:  demand  deposit 
funds  can  be  used  to  make  loans  and  purchase  other 
interest-bearing  assets  the  revenues  from  which  are  a 
major  source  of  commercial  bank  income.  Competi- 
tion  for  these  funds  cannot  take  the  form  of  an 
explicit  interest  rate  and  must,  therefore,  seek  alter- 
native  outlets.  Perhaps  the  most  obvious  alternative 
is for  a  bank  to  reduce  its  charges  to  depositors  for 
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BALANCES,  INCOME,  EXPENSES,  AND 
IMPLICIT  INTEREST  COST  PER  PERSONAL 
CHECKING  ACCOUNT,  BY  SIZE  OF  BANK 
1975 
Deposits  Deposits  Deposits 
vp  to  $50M  $50-200M  over  S200M 
Average  baiance 
per  account  $783.00  $967.00  $1,021.00 
Income  from  service 
and  penalty  charges 
(per  yeor)  14.80  11.28  14.56 
Expenses  (per  year)  46.29  49.87  62.59 
Implicit  interest  payment  31.49  38.59  48.03 
Implicit  interest  rate  4.02%  3.99%  4.70% 
Implicit  interest  rate 
adjusted  for  reserve 
requirements  4.43%  4.49%  5.48% 
Source:  Federal  Reserve  Board  [3,  p.  221. 
the  use  of  bank  payments  services  below  the  cost  to 
the  bank  of  providing  those  services. 
A  recent  study  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Board 
staff  [3]  attempted  to  quantify  this  dimension  of  the 
implicit  demand  deposit  rate  using  data  from  the 
Federal  Reserve’s  Functional  Cost  Analysis  Pro- 
gram.  The  program  is  designed  to  estimate  the 
costs  and  revenues  associated  with  various  bank 
functions.  Table  I  summarizes  the  Board’s  esti- 
mates  for  participating  banks  in  1975. 
Implicit  deposit  rates  were  calculated  by  deducting 
annual  service  charge  income  per  account  from  ex- 
penses  per  account  and  dividing  the  remainder  by  the 
average  dollar  balance  per  account.  These  estimates 
appear  in the  next  to  last  row.  The  final  row  adjusts 
the  interest  rate  for  demand  deposit  reserve  require- 
ments.  Since  banks  must  hold  non-interest-bearing 
reserves  equal  to  a  minimum  percentage  of  their 
demand  deposits,  the  cost  to  a  bank  for  acquiring 
funds  available  for  Zending  is  correspondingly  in- 
creased. 
It  is  important  to  understand  that  these  calcula- 
tions  take  account  of  only  one  easily  quantifiable 
method  of  circumventing  the  prohibition:  the  remis- 
sion  of  service  charges.  In  some  circumstances  such 
calculations  may  significantly  understate  total  implicit 
interest  payments.  For  example,  using  the  above 
methodology  the  Board  staff  study  calculated  the 
implicit  deposit  rate  paid  to  conznzercial  demand  de- 
posit  customers.  The  estimated  rates  after  adjust- 
ment  for  reserve  requirements  were  1.60,  1.32,  and 
1.42 percent  for  the  three  size  classifications  of  banks 
iisted  in  order  of  increasing  size.  The  estimated 
interest  rates  on  commercial  accounts  were,  there- 
fore,  oniy  approximately  one-third  of  the  rates  on 
personal  accounts.  Yet  it  is  well  known,  and  recog- 
nized  by  the  Board  study,  that  banks  use  devices 
other  than  the  remission  of  service  charges  to  com- 
pensate  business  depositors.  A  wide  variety  of  cash 
management  services  at  subsidized  rates  is  made 
available  by  banks  to  business  firms.  In  addition  to 
the  provision  of  transactions  services,  depositor-bor- 
rowers  may  be  given  preferential  lending  treatment 
in  the  form  of reduced  loan  interest  rates  or  superior 
nonprice  lending  terms.  These  and  other  elements 
of  the  complex  relationship  between  a  bank  and  its 
depositors  may  be  more  difficult  to  quantify  but  are 
not,  for  that  reason,  any  less  important  than  the: 
more  easiiy  quantifiable  remission  of  service  charges. 
The  results  of  three  different  approaches  to  the 
estimation  of  implicit  interest  rates  are  presented  in 
Table  II.  The  first  two  columns  provide  time  series 
for  the  estimated  demand  deposit  interest  rate 
whereas  the  third  column  presents  estimates  of  the 
rate  of  interest  on  Mi,  which  includes  currency  as 
well  as demand  deposits,  for  the  1960-68  period.  The 
reader  will  undoubtedly  be  struck  by  the  differences 
in  the  magnitudes  of  these  estimates.  It  is  to  be 
remembered,  however,  that  no  comprehensive  data 
source  exists  and  very  different  conceptual  ap- 
proaches  were  used  by  the  authors  of  the  three 
studies. 
The  rates  shown  in  column  1,  from  William 
Becker’s  study  [Z] , were  derived  by  taking  all  non- 
interest  expenses  of  a  bank,  subtracting  service 
Table  II 
ESTIMATED  DEMAND  DEPOSIT  INTEREST  RATES 
(PERCENT)  FROM  THREE  STUDIES 












W.  Becker  [2]  Sarro-Santomero  [l]  8.  Klein  [131 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
2.64  1.72  2.38 
2.75  1.72  1.74 
2.89  1.72  1.94 
2.95  1.77  2.12 
2.98  1.80  2.40 
3.25  1.93  2.68 
3.32  2.12  3.46 
3.54  2.26  3.11 
3.74  2.42  3.70 
Note:  Estimates  reported  in  column  3  are  weighted  averages  of 
the  interest  rote  on  demand  deposits  and  the  assumed  rero 
rate  of  return  on  currency. 
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demand  deposits.  Federal  Reserve  data  on  the  in- 
come  and  expenses  of  member  banks  were  used  and 
since  all  non-interest  bank  expenses  are  attributed 
to  the  demand  deposit  function,  the  series  is  almost 
certainly  biased  upward  to  a  significant  extent. 
In  contrast,  the  Barro-Santomero  study  [l]  is 
based  on  the  authors’  own  survey  of  23  commercial 
banks.  The  figures  presented  are  simply  average 
remission  rates  on  personal  accounts.  A  remission 
rate  of  $0.10  per  month  per  $100,  for  example, 
would  be  stated  as an  interest  rate  of  1.2 percent  per 
year.  Since  remission  of  service  charges  based  on 
minimum  balances  is  only  one  method  by  which 
banks  subsidize  their  depositors’  use  of  the  payments 
mechanism,  actual  implicit  rates  were  undoubtedly 
higher  than  those  appearing  in  column  2. 
Conceptually,  Benjamin  Klein’s  [ 131  estimates 
(column  3)  are  the  most  interesting.  Rather  than 
basing  an  estimate  of  the  deposit  rate  on  revenue 
and  cost  data,  he  attempts  to  estimate  what  rate  of 
interest  banks  would  have  paid  on  deposits  had  the 
prohibition  not  been  in  force.  Put  differently,  he 
attempts  to  estimate  what  the  competitive,  market 
determined,  demand  deposit  interest  rate  would  have 
been.  He  then  assumes  that  the  prohibition  was,  in 
fact,  completely  ineffective  and  that,  in  one  way  or 
another,  the  competitive  rate  was  paid  to  depositors. 
The  nature  of  his  results  is  described  in  more  detail 
in  the  following  section  of  this  article. 
All  three  time  series  have  a  remarkable  tendency 
to  move  together:  remarkable  given  the  differences 
in  data  and  conceptual  approaches.  The  simple  cor- 
relation  coefficient  between  columns  1 and  2  is  .97; 
between  columns  2  and  3  it  is  .93;  and  between 
columns  1 and  3  it  is  .88.  We  may  not  know  the 
esact  size  of  the  implicit  deposit  rate,  but  we  have  a 
pretty  clear  idea  of  the  direction  in  which  it  is 
moving  ! 
111.  SOME  USES  OF  THE  CONCEPT 
The  Implicit  Deposit  Rate  and  the  Demand  for 
Money  One  of  the  most  interesting  recent 
studies  in  which  the  concept  of  an  implicit  deposit 
rate  is given  central  importance  is  Benjamin  Klein’s 
analysis  of  the  determinants  of  the  demand  for 
money  [13].  The  basic  question  he  poses  is  this  : 
does  the  inclusion  of  a  measure  of  the  implicit  de- 
posit  rate  among  the  determinants  of  the  demand  for 
money  significantly  improve  economists’  ability  to 
explain  the  public’s  money-holding  behavior  over 
long  periods  of  time?  Conventional  demand  for 
money  functions  that  exclude  the  rate  of  return  on 
demand  deposits  are  used  as  benchmarks  for  com- 
parison. 
The  most  common  form  of  the  money  demand 
function  appearing  in  these  expositions  is  given  by 
the  equation 
(1)  Md/P  =  f(r,Y) 
where  M”  is  the  demand  for  nominal  balances,  P  is 
the  price  level,  Md/P  is  the  demand  for  real  cash 
balances,  r is the  rate  of interest,  and  Y  is the  level  of 
real  income.  Although  there  exist  substantial  vari- 
ations  on  the  theme,  virtually  all  empirical  studies  of 
the  determinants  of  money  demand  include  some 
scale  variable  such  as  measured  income,  permanent 
income,  or  wealth,  and  some  measure  of  the  oppor- 
tunity  cost  of holding  money  such  as the  rate  of inter- 
est  on  other  liquid  assets.  The  latter  is  included  to 
represent  the  sacrifice  involved  in  holding  money 
rather  than  some  other  asset  which,  unlike  money, 
cannot  be  used  directly  to  make  payments  but  can  be 
easily  converted  into  money  should  the  need  arise 
and  carries  an  explicit  rate  of  return.  Of  course,  it 
is  anticipated  that  a  rise  in  r  will  lower  money  de- 
mand-a  proposition  which  is  repeatedly  confirmed 
by  empirical  studies. 
Klein  contends  that  the  above  specification  of  the 
cost  of  holding  money  is  likely  to  be  seriously  mis- 
leading.  Since  it  identifies  the  cost  of  holding  money 
with  the  (usually  short-term)  rate  of  interest,  this 
measure  assumes  that  there  is  no  pecuniary  rate  of 
return,  explicit  or  implicit,  to  the  holding  of  money 
balances.  If,  however,  the  prohibition  of  interest  is 
either  partially  or  totally  evaded,  then  this  measure 
will  overstate  the  true  cost  of  money  holdings. 
Klein  has  a  second  criticism,  somewhat  more  in- 
volved,  but  helpful  to an  understanding  of his  empiri- 
cal  results.  Consider  the  three  assets  listed  below: 
Asset  RR”,‘t’,rif 
OpP~mt&nity 
1.  Money  rm  i -  rm =  Pm 
2.  Money  Substitute  rs  i-  rs =  Ps 
3.  Long-term  Bond  i  0 
The  first  asset  is identified  as  money  proper  : literally 
the  medium  of  exchange.  It  bears  an  interest  rate, 
denoted  by  rm,  that  can  be  explicit  or  implicit  and 
may  or  may  not  be  equal  to  zero.  The  opportunity 
cost  of  holding  money  is  found  by  subtracting  rm 
from  the  rate  of  return  on  a  second  asset  that  yields 
no  monetary  exchange  services  at  all.  This  latter 
asset  is identified  in row  3 and  may  be visualized  as a 
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The  difference  i  -  r,  is  denoted  by  the  symbol  P,. 
Klein  refers  to  P,  as  the  “rental  price”  of  the  ex- 
change  services  provided  by  a  dollar  of  money  hold- 
ings. 
The  third  asset  (row  2)  is  defined  as  a  money 
substitute.  It  yields  exchange  services-at  the  very 
least,  it  can  be  quickly  and  easily  converted  into 
money  at  a  very  small  cost-and  pays  an  explicit 
rate  of  return  denoted  as  rs.  P,  is  its  opportunity 
cost  and  is  referred  to  as  the  rental  price  for  the 
exchange  services  provided  by  the  money  substitute. 
Just  as  the  demand  for  any  commodity  or  service 
is a function  of  its  price,  the  price  of close  substitutes 
and  complements,  and  income,  so  the  demand  for 
money  can  be  written  as: 
(2)  Md/P  =  f(Pm,P*,Y>. 
How  is  the  usual  specification  of  money  demand 
given  by  equation  1 related  to  the  very  general  form 
of  equation  22  Klein  points  out  that  equation  1 
implicitly  assumes  that  it  is  the  difference  between 
the  rental  prices  of  money  and  money  substitutes 
which  determines  the  demand  for  money.  In  this 
case, 
(3)  Md/P  =  f(P,  -  Ps,Y). 
From  the  definitions  given  above,  the  following  rela- 
tionship  exists  : 
(4)  P,  -  P,  =  (i  -  r,)  -  (i  -  r,)  =  r,  -  rm. 
If,  as  in  conventional  money  demand  analysis,  the 
implicit  deposit  rate  is  ignored,  then  rm  =  0, 
pm  -  Ps  =  rs,  and  equation  3  reduces  to  the  con- 
ventional  equation  1. 
If  this  seems  somewhat  abstract,  a  simple  example 
may  be  helpful.  Imagine  it  is  hypothesized  that  the 
demand  for  butter  is a  function  of  the  price  of  butter 
and  the  price  of  a  close  substitute  such  as margarine. 
Equation  1 implicitly  asserts  that  it  is  the  differelzce 
between  the  prices  of  butter  and  margarine  that  is 
relevant  whereas  equation  2  is  more  general,  stating 
only  that  both  prices  are  relevant  but  not  imposing 
any  particular  restriction  on  the  nature  of  the  de- 
pendence. 
Finally,  as  indicated  in  the  previous  section,  in 
conducting  his  analysis  Klein  assumes  that  a  com- 
petitive  rate  of  interest  was  paid  on  deposits  in  spite 
of  the  prohibition.  Rather  than  a  direct  calculation 
of  costs  and  revenues,  the  implicit  deposit  rate  is 
related  to  the  rate  of  interest  that  banks  could  earn 
Table  111 
FORMS  OF  REGRESSIONS  AND  COEFFICIENT 
ESTIMATES 
A.  Form  and  Time  Period  of  Regressions 
(A)  log  M2  =  a0  +  al  log  Y  +  a2Ps  +  aaPm 
(1880-l  970) 
(B)  log  M2  =  a0  +  al  log  Y  +  02~ 
(1880-1970) 
CC)  log  Ml  =  a0  +  al  log  Y  +  a2Ps  +  03Pm 
(1919-1970) 







8.  Coefficient  Estimates 
Standard1 
Error  of 
Y  Ps  Pm  Y  rs  Estimate 
1.33  .33  -  .34  -0773 
1.52  -  .06  .1207 
1.56  .42  -.45  -1254 
1.31  -.lO  .1493 
Note:  All  reported  coefficient  estimates  are  significant  at  the  99 
confidence  level. 
Source:  Adapted  from  Benjamin  Klein  1131. 
on  their  marginal  investments.2  After  adjustment  for 
reserve  requirements  and  other  costs  and  subsidies 
implicit  in  U.  S.  banking  regulations,  a  deposit  rate 
series  is  constructed.  The  rate  of  return  on  money 
is  then  taken  as  a  weighted  average  of  the  rates  of 
return  on  the  components  of  the  money  stock. 
On  this  basis,  Klein  compares  regression  results 
for  equations  that  have  the  general  form  of equation  2 
above  with  the  results  for  equations  having  the  con- 
ventional  form  of  equation  1.  A  summary  of  the:se 
results  is  presented  in  Table  III.  Equations  A  and 
C  include  the  implicit  rate  of  return  on  the  holding 
of  money  whereas  equations  B  and  D  do  not.  Klein 
shows  that  A  and  C  have  significantly  smaller  stan- 
dard  errors  of  estimate  than  do  their  counterparts. 
In  other  words,  the  hypothesis  that  the  prohibition 
of  interest  payments  on  money  has  been  completely 
ineffective  has  more  “explanatory  power”  than  does 
the  alternative  hypothesis  that  it  has  been  completely 
effective. 
2  Designating  rd  as  the  deposit  rate,  r1  as  the  marginal 
return  on  bank  investment,  and  R/D  as  the  marginal 
reserve  to  deposit  ratio,  then  (assuming  reserves  earn  no 
interest)  the  competitive  deposit  rate  would  be  rd  = 
rI(1  -  R/D). 
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mates,  except  for  sign,  of  P,  and  P,  in  equations  A 
and  C.  If,  as  is  frequently  alleged,  P,  -  P,  is  an 
appropriate  measure  of  the  cost  of  holding  money 
(recall  that  P,  -  P,  is  simply  ry  -  r,),  the  esti- 
mated  coefficients  of  P,  and  P,  in equations  A  and  C 
should  be identical  except  for  sign.  The  actual  differ- 
ence  between  the  coefficients  is  small  enough  to  be 
attributed  to  random  error  and,  therefore,  the  hy- 
pothesis  that  rs  -  r,  is  an  appropriate  measure  of 
the  cost  of  holding  money  cannot  be  rejected.  The 
inclusion  of  a  measure  of  the  implicit  rate  of  return 
on money  has  enhanced  the  explanatory  power  of  the 
regression  equations.  Therefore,  Klein  concludes 
that  the  hypothesis  that  the  prohibition  of  interest  on 
demand  deposits  has  been  effectiveIy  enforced  can  be 
rejected. 
In  addition  to  providing  an  imaginative  approach 
to  the  measurement  of  the  implicit  deposit  rate, 
Klein’s  work  is  important  because  it  suggests  that 
regulatory  policies  affecting  the  payment  of  interest 
on  demand  deposits  may  have  significant  zptacro- 
econo&  implications.  When  market  interest  rates 
rise,  there  will  be  an  associated  increase  in  the  im- 
piicit  return  to  holding  money.  This  results  from 
the  increased  competition  among  banks  for  deposit 
funds.  Klein’s  results  imply  that  this  rise  in  the 
deposit  rate  will  reduce  the  impact  of  a  given  rise 
in the  market  interest  rate  on  the  demand  for  money. 
Thus  the  observed  change  in  the  demand  for  money 
is smaller  than  it  would  have  been  if  deposit  interest 
prohibition  had  been  effectively  enforced. 
Imagine  that  deposit  interest  prohibition  is  re- 
pealed  and  that  an  explicit,  competitively  determined 
deposit  interest  rate  replaces  the  implicit  rate.  As- 
sume,  as  seems  likely,  that  the  explicit  rate  can  be 
adjusted  more  quickly  and,  perhaps,  to  a  greater 
degree  in  response  to  a  change  in  market  interest 
rates  than  could  the  implicit  deposit  rate.  It  would 
then  follow  that  a change  in  the  market  interest  rate 
would  induce  a  smaller  change  in  the  demand  for 
money  than  it  does  under  present  conditions. 
The  macroeconomic  implications  of  this  depend, 
of  course,  on  the  particular  macroeconomic  model 
used.  In  terms  of  the  we11 known  IS-LM  model, 
this  reduction  in  the  sensitivity  of  the  demand  for 
money  to  the  market  interest  rate  would  make  the 
LM  curve  more  nearly  vertical.  This  has  the  effect 
of  reducing  the  expansionary  impact  of  a  rise  in 
government  spending  financed  by  either  taxes  or  the 
issuance  of  bonds.  At  the  same  time,  the  impact  of  a 
change  in  the  money  supply  would  be  correspond- 
ingly  increased. 
D&aggregating  the  Money  Demand  Function 
Benjamin  Klein’s  work  reIates  the  rate  of  return  on 
money  to  the  demand  for  money.  But  even  the  nar- 
rowest  definition  of  the  money  stock  commonly  used 
( M1)  consists  of  currency  held  by  the  public  as  well 
as  demand  deposits.  Since  an  implicit  return  is paid 
only  on  demand  deposits,  the  question  arises  as  to 
how  the  demands  for  currency  and  demand  deposits 
individually  respond  to  a  change  in  the  implicit  de- 
posit  rate. 
Although  a  number  of  studies  of  the  public’s  cur- 
rency  holding  behavior  exist,  the  only  recent  study 
which  makes  the  implicit  demand  deposit  rate  central 
to  both  the  theoretical  and  empirical  analysis  is  that 
of  William  Becker  [Z],  whose  estimates  of  the  im- 
plicit  demand  deposit  rate  were  encountered  in  Sec- 
tion  II.  Becker  relates  the  demands  for  currency 
and  demand  deposits  to  the  implicit  demand  deposit 
rate  as well as to  the  rates  of interest  on  time  deposits 
and  open-market  assets.  To  represent  the  latter,  the 
4-6  month  commercial  paper  rate  was  used.  He 
found  that  although  the  demand  for  demand  deposits 
was  sensitive  to  all  three  interest  rates,  currency 
holdings  were  not  significantly  influenced  by  any 
interest  rate  vzriable. 
These  findings  tend  to  substantiate  a  previous 
study  by  Alan  Hess  [lo].  Hess  did  not  include  the 
rates  of  return  on  time  and  demand  deposits  in  his 
currency  demand  function  and  measured  the  cost  of 
holding  currency  exclusively  by  the  4-6  month  com- 
mercial  paper  rate.  As  did  Becker,  he  found  that 
demand  deposit  holdings  were  sensitive  to  variations 
in the  rate  of interest  whereas  currency  holdings  were 
not. 
In  contrast,  <neoretical  models  of  household  money 
demand  strongly  suggest  that  a  rise  in  the  rate  of 
interest  on  demand  deposits  should  lead  to  a  fall  in 
desired  currency  holdings.  For  example,  two  recent 
models  treat  the  household’s  decision  problem  as  one 
of  financing  a  flow  of  expenditures  over  an  interval 
of  time  in  a  cost  minimizing  manner.  In  one  model 
[ 11,  the  household  has  a  choice  of  three  assets  to 
hold  : currency,  demand  deposits,  and  liquid,  interest- 
bearing  assets.  In  the  other  model  [ 141,  the  asset 
list  is extended  to  include  inventories  of commodities. 
In  both  models,  the  demand  deposit  interest  rate 
affects  the  optimal  currency  holdings  of  the  house- 
hold-a  rise  in  the  former  being  associated  with  a 
fall  in  the  latter. 
If  theoretical  analysis  repeatedly  indicates  the  im- 
portance  of  the  demand  deposit  rate  to  the  demand 
for  currency,  why  hasn’t  this  relationship  been  un- 
covered  by  the  empirical  analysis?  Utilizing  a  the- 
oretical  model  of  transactor  behavior  [ 141,  it  can  be 
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OUTSTANDING  NOW  ACCOUNT  BALANCES  IN  MASSACHUSElTS 
BY  TYPE  OF  ISSUING  INSTITUTION 
(thousands  of  dollars) 
Mutual  Savings 
Total  Commercial  Banks  Banks  -  Savings  and  loans 
Month  Ended  Amount  Percent  Amount  Percent  Amount  Percent  Amount  Percent  --  --  --  -  - 
Sept.  1972 
Dec.  1972 
Dec.  1973 
Dec.  1974 
Dec.  1975 
Dec.  1976 
Nov.  1977 
Jan.  1978 
11,094  100 
44522  loo 
138,028  100 
286,819  100  56,989 
742,516  100  302,029 
1,439#559  100  807,277 
1,852,491  100  1,051,351 
1,915,409  100  1,097#545 
Note:  Sums  may  not  add  to  100  due  to  rounding  errors. 
Source:  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Boston  Statistical  Release. 
shown  that  a rise  in the  implicit  deposit  rate  (brought 
about,  for  example,  by  a  fall  in  service  charges  as  a 
‘result  of  a  new  entrant  into  a  banking  market)  will 
induce  transactors  to  increase  their  average  holdings 
of  demand  deposits  at  the  expense  of  both  currency 
and  commodity  inventories.  Thus,  the  magnitude  of 
the  effect  of  a  change  in  the  deposit  interest  rate  on 
demand  deposit  holdings  is  expected  to  be  substan- 
tially  larger  (and,  of  course,  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion)  than  its  impact  on  currency  holdings. 
The  discussion  of  Section  II  revealed  that  there 
is  no  generally  accepted  method  of  measuring  the 
implicit  deposit  rate.  It  is  possible  that  conceptual 
difficulties  in  measurement  reinforce  the  theoretical 
implication  that  currency  holdings  are  less  sensitive 
than  are  desired  demand  deposit  holdings  to  vari- 
ations  in  the  implicit  deposit  rate.  This  theme  is 
taken  up  again  in  the  concluding  section  of  the 
article. 
IV.  THE  SUBSTITUTION  OF  EXPLICIT  FOR 
IMPLICIT  PAYMENTS  ON  DEPOSITS 
Private  Financial  Innovation  The  decade  of  the 
1970’s  has  already  witnessed  profound  changes  in 
the  nature  of  the  services  offered  by  non-bank  thrift 
institutions.  These  changes  have  affected  the  com- 
petitive  relationship  between  banks  and  thrift  insti- 
tutions  and  promise  to  generate  an  intensive  and  far- 
reaching  reexamination  of  the  regulatory  and  struc- 
tural  environment  confronting  various  classes  of 






11,094  100.0 
44522  100.0 
138,02B  100.0 
200,083  69.8  29,747  10.4 
356,319  48.0  84,168  11.3 
497,07  1  34.5  135,211  9.4 
627,708  33.9  173,432  9.4 
636,537  33.2  181,327  9.5 
most  certainly  continue  their  efforts  to  attract  dfe- 
positors  by  offering  transactions  instruments  that 
bear  explicit  interest.  In  this  context,  the  question  (of 
whether  explicit  interest  payments  should  continue 
to  be  prohibited  on  some  transactions  balances  will 
be  under  continuous  reevaluation. 
A  financial  history  of  this  period  will  undoubtedly 
cite  the  introduction  of  negotiable  orders  of  with- 
drawal-NOW  accounts-as  the  primary  catalyst  for 
these  changes.  After  a  two  year  court  battle,  NOW 
accounts  were  first  offered  by  the  Consumer  Savings 
Bank  of  Worcester,  Massachusetts,  on  June  12, 
1972.3  The  NOW  account  is  simply  a  method  of 
withdrawing  funds  from  an  interest-bearing  savings 
account  by  means  of  a  negotiable  instrument  payable 
to  third  parties. 
By  the  end  of  that  year,  22  other  mutual  savings 
banks  in  Massachusetts  had  adopted  NOW  accounts 
and  the  development  began  to  spread  to  New  Hamp- 
shire  where  state  laws  governing  savings  banks  are 
similar  to  those  of  Massachusetts.  Commercial  banks 
were  excluded  from  this  development  because  Fed- 
eral  Reserve  and  FDIC  regulations  prohibited  the 
execution  of  third-party  payments  from  savings  :ac- 
counts.  Federal  Reserve  Board  estimates  of  the 
proportion  of  NOW  balances  attracted  from  com- 
mercial  bank  demand  deposits  suggest  80  percent 
as  a  reasonable  approximation  [ 161.  Clearly,  ,the 
competitive  position  of  banks  in  these  states  was 
rapidly  becoming  untenable. 
3 A  good  survey  of  these  developments  is  found  in  [Ill. 
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on  August  16,  1973,  which  permitted  commercial 
banks  in  these  states  to  begin  offering  NOVCT ac- 
counts  in  January  1974.  Table  IV  recounts  the 
growth  of  KOW  accounts  in  Massachusetts  and  its 
breakdown  between  depository  institutions. 
The  pricing  of  NOW  accounts  is  interesting  both 
in  its  own  right  and  because  it  is  at  least  indicative 
,of  pricing  responses  to  be  expected  in  a  variety  of 
alternative  contexts.  Although  the  maximum  rate 
of  interest  payable  on  NOW  accounts  is  determined 
by  regulation  rather  than  the  market,  the  NOW 
experiment  is  a  vivid  example  of  the  substitution  of 
explicit  interest  payments  for  implicit  payments  on 
transactions  balances. 
As  of  September  30,  1977,  112  commercial  banks 
were  offering  NOW  accounts  in  Massachusetts.  Of 
these,  108  were  paying  the  maximum  legal  interest 
rate  of  5 percent  although  a  wide  variety  of  methods 
of  calculating  interest  and  different  frequencies  of 
compounding  were  used.  Perhaps  more  interesting 
is  the  diversity  of  approaches  used  in  pricing  trans- 
actions  services.  Only  19  banks  offered  unlimited 
free  drafts  ; 5 banks  charged  $10  per  draft  ; 7 charged 
$15  per  draft  ;  and  81  are  classified  as  “other”  by 
the  Boston  Federal  Reserve.*  This  last  category 
includes  banks  using  a  combination  of  free  drafts 
plus  a  charge  for  each  draft  in  excess  of  a  specified 
number.  Furthermore,  there  is  evidence  [33  that 
when  the  NOW  experiment  was  extended  to  the 
remaining  New  England  states  in  March  1976,  there 
was  a  substantial  drop  in  the  percentage  of  institu- 
tions  of all types  offering  unlimited  free  drafts.  Thus, 
the  payment  of  explicit  interest  appears  to  have  been 
accompanied  by  the  pricing  of  transactions  services 
more  nearly  in accordance  with  the  private  and  social 
cost  of  providing  them. 
A  clear  analysis  of  the  efficiency  implications  of 
the  substitution  of  explicit  for  implicit  pricing  is 
found  in  Harry  Johnson  [ 121.  Johnson  defines  a 
socially  efficient  monetary  system  as  one  in  which 
competition  between  banks  forces  the  payment  of  a 
competitive,  explicit  rate  of  return  on  the  holding  of 
a stock  of  deposits.  At  the  same  time,  banks  charge 
for  their  payments  services  in  a competitive  fa?hion; 
that  is, in a manner  that  reflects  the  private  and  social 
costs  of  the  resources  allocated  to  the  production  of 
those  services.  In  this  fashion,  the  public  will  hold 
4 The  Statistical  Section  of  the  Research  Department  of 
the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Boston  publishes  data  per- 
taining  to  NOW  accounts  in  New  England  on  a  monthly 
basis.  All  NOW  account  data  used  in  this  article  are 
from  that  source. 
the  socially  optimal  quantity  of  money  and  will  also 
consider  the  correct  opportunity  cost  of  the  resources 
used  in  providing  payments  services  in  their  deci- 
sions  as  to  how  intensively  to  use  the  bank  payments 
mechanism. 
In  contrast,  the  prohibition  of  explicit  interest 
payments  provides  the  wrong  signals  to  depositors. 
The  nonpayment  of  explicit  interest  induces  house- 
holds  and  business  firms  to  economize  on  their  hold- 
ings  of  cash  balances  when  there  is no  social  need  to 
do  so.  At  the  same  time,  implicit  payments-such 
as  service  charges  set  below  the  cost  to  a  bank  of 
providing  the  services  of  the  payments  mechanism- 
encourage  excessive  utilization  of  that  mechanism. 
There  is,  therefore,  a  resulting  increase  in  the  value 
of  society’s  resources  allocated  to  the  provision  of 
payments  services. 
A  second  reason  for  the  importance  of  NOW  ac- 
counts  is  that  these  accounts  can  be  issued-indeed 
were  initiated-by  non-bank  financial  intermediaries. 
Thus  a  degree  of  functional  specialization  hitherto 
existing  between  deposit-type  institutions  has  been 
significantly  eroded.  Such  specialization  has  his- 
torically  been  encouraged  or  required  by  regulatory 
policy  through  limitations  on  asset  acquisition  and 
liability  issuance  of  different  institutions.  Financial 
innovation  such  as  the  NOW  account  may  suggest 
that  the  degree  of  regulatory-induced  specialization 
is  neither  socially  nor  privately  optimal.  Perhaps 
more  fundamentally,  competitive  pressures  toward 
financial  innovation  in  conjunction  with  advances  in 
payments  technology  may  render  it  impossible  to 
maintain  through  regulation  a  non-interest-bearing 
transactions  instrument.  As  a  result,  the  traditional 
demand  deposit  may  have  to  adapt  to  changed  cir- 
cumstances  or  face  extinction.5 
Finally,  the  implications  of  the  substitution  of 
explicit  for  implicit  payments  deserve  careful  study 
because  the  potential  domain  of  applicability  of  this 
structural  change  goes  well  beyond  the  XOW  ex- 
periment  itself.  In  late  June  1978,  the  Federal  Re- 
serve  Board  made  public  a  proposal  for  the  payment 
of interest  on  reserves  combined  with  explicit  pricing 
of  Federal  Reserve  services.  In  other  words,  it 
proposed  a substitution  of explicit  for  implicit  pricing 
in  its  relationship  with  its  member  banks.  The 
following  section  examines  the  background  to  and 
justification  for  the  proposal. 
8 Evolution  is  the  likely  alternative.  On  May  1,  1978,  the 
Board  of  Governors  approved  a  plan  that  will  permit 
individual  customers  of  member  banks  to  transfer  funds 
automatically  from  their  savings  to  their  checking  ac- 
counts  beginning  November  1,  1978. 
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ber  banks  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  are  re- 
quired  to  hold  non-interest-bearing  deposits  at  the 
Federal  Reserve.  As  a  benefit  of  membership  in 
the  System,  banks  are  provided  a  variety  of  “corre- 
spondent”  services  by  the  Federal  Reserve.  These 
services  include  the  clearing  and  collection  of  checks, 
currency  shipments,  wire  transfer  of  funds,  security 
safekeeping,  and  others.  Although  the  Federal  Re- 
serve  provides  some  services  to  nonmember  banks, 
these  banks  usually  utilize  the  correspondent  services 
of  other  (generally  larger)  banks. 
When  one  bank  provides  correspondent  services  to 
another  bank,  the  recipient  (or  respondent)  bank 
“compensates”  the  providing  (or  correspondent) 
bank  by  holding  non-interest-bearing  demand  bal- 
ances  with  it  in  lieu  of  direct  charges  for  the  services 
of  the  correspondent.  There  is  evidence  that  direct 
user  fees  [7]  are  currently  being  assessed  with 
greater  frequency  than  in  the  past  for  a  variety  of 
correspondent  services.  But  the  general  picture 
remains:  in  exchange  for  a  flow  of  correspondent 
services,  non-interest-bearing  deposits  are  held  with 
the  providing  bank.  Equivalently,  correspondent 
banks  pay  an  implicit  return  on  the  correspondent 
balances  they  hold,  just  as  banks  in  general  pay  an 
implicit  return  to  their  demand  depositors. 
The  Federal  Reserve’s  provision  of  services  to  its 
member  banks  approximates,  at  least  in  form,  the 
correspondent  arrangements  between  private  com- 
mercial  banks.  The  Federal  Reserve  provides  ser- 
vices  to  its  members  similar  to  those  provided  by 
correspondent  banks  to  their  customers  and  member 
banks  hold  non-interest-bearing  deposits  at  the  Fed- 
eral  Reserve. 
If  this  is  so,  why  is the  Federal  Reserve  proposing 
a  fundamental  reform  of  the  system?  The  Board’s 
proposal  could  be  justified  in  terms  of  the  efficiency 
argument  presented  in  the  previous  section  of  this 
article.  One  important  element  of  Professor  John- 
son’s  thesis  is  that  the  Federal  Reserve  should  pay 
interest  on  reserves  and  charge  for  its  services.  The 
nonpayment  of  interest  on  reserves  is  viewed  as  a 
tax,  the  burden  of  which  falls  primarily  on  the  de- 
posit-holding  public. 
The  Federal  Reserve  Board’s  stated  justification 
for  the  reform  is  different.  The  reform  is  designed 
“to  promote  equality  among  member  banks  and  other 
financial  institutions  and  to  encourage  membership 
in  the  Federal  Reserve  System.”  To  understand  the 
problem  that  implicit  pricing  poses  for  the  Federal 
Reserve,  a  simple  example  may  be  helpful. 
Imagine  there  are  two  comparably  sized  nonmem- 
ber  banks,  Bank  A  and  Bank  B,  both  served  by  a. 
correspondent  bank,  Bank  C.  Assume  that  their 
demands  for  correspondent  services  differ  substan- 
tially.  In  particular,  Bank  A  requires  fewer  check- 
clearing  services  than  does  Bank  B.  Bank  C,  the 
correspondent  bank,  will  require  Bank  B  to  pay  for 
the  additiona  check-clearing  services  by  requiring 
it  to  hoId  a  larger  deposit  balance  than  it  requires 
from  Bank  A.  In  this  way,  the  private  market  can 
flexibly  adjust  the  costs  of  correspondent  services  to 
the  benefits  received  by  the  respondent  bank.6 
In  contrast,  the  balance  held  by an  individual  mem- 
ber  bank  at  the  Federal  Reserve  bears  no  direct 
relationship  to  the  flow  of  Federal  Reserve  services 
received  by  the  bank.  Instead,  these  balances  are 
determined  by  reserve  requirement  ratios.  A  mem- 
ber  bank  that  uses  relatively  few  Federal  Reserve 
services  cannot,  for  that  reason,  reduce  its  reserve 
balance  below  that  of another  comparably  sized  mem:- 
ber  bank  that  utilizes  these  services  intensively.  I:t 
follows  that  the  implicit  rate  of  return  on  member 
bank  reserves  varies  directly  with  the  utilization  of 
Federal  Reserve  services. 
Member  banks  differ  substantially  in  their  utiliza- 
tion  of  Federal  Reserve  services.  Two  recent  studies 
are  indicative.  In  one  [8],  R.  A.  Gilbert  surveye:d 
233  member  banks  in  the  Eighth  Federal  Reserve 
District.  Banks  were  ranked  by  size  of  assets  and 
divided  into  11  groups  of  20  banks  each  plus  a  re- 
maining  group  consisting  of  the  13  largest  banks  in 
the  survey.  The  percentage  of  banks  in  the  various 
groups  that  cleared  six  or  more  checks  through  the 
St.  Louis  Federal  Reserve  Bank  during  January 
1977  ranged  from  zero  in  the  second  group  (average 
asset  size  of $7.2  million)  to 92  percent  in  the  largest 
bank  group  (average  asset  size  of  $425  million). 
Using  a  method  similar  to  Becker’s  procedure  for 
calculating  the  implicit  return  on  deposits,  Gilbert 
estimates  that  the  implicit  return  on  reserves  is  ap- 
proximately  one-half  of  one  percent  for  small  banks 
and  1.7  percent  for  the  large  banks  surveyed. 
s This  argument  is  subject  to  a  qualification  imposed  by 
the  existence  of  state  reserve  requirements.  If  state  re- 
serve  requirements  forced  nonmember  banks  to  hold 
correspondent  balances  in  excess  of  those  which  would 
be  required  to  compensate  the  providing  bank  for  its 
provision  of  correspondent  services,  the  adjustment  pro- 
cess  described  above  would  be  retarded.  However,  non- 
member  banks  appear  to  hold  cash  assets  significarrtly 
in  excess  of  the  amount  reauired  to  satisfy  state  reserve 
requirements  14,  Appendix-A]  although  -one  study  [.9] 
did  find  a  relationshin  between  the  level  of  state  reserve 
requirements  and  the  amount  of  cash  assets  held  by 
nonmember  banks. 
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NUMERICAL  SUMMARY  OF  COMMERCIAL  BANKS 
BY  MEMBERSHIP-SERVICE  USE  COMBINATION 
Fifth  District  States  - January  1978 
Deposit  Size  Groups 
AI\  Banks 
SO-2%  $2550M  $50.1  OOM  $0.100M  -I__-- 
State  MU  MN  MU  MN  MU  MN  MU  MN  --  --  --  -- 
Maryland  2  16  7  5  5  3  14  24 
North  Carolina  8  6  5  1  1  1  14  B 
South  Carolina  8  8  4  1  1  0  13  9 
Virginia  20  68  16  30  5  6  41  104 
West  Virginia  9  57  7  20  9  5  25  82 
Total  47  155  39  57  21  15  107  227 
Note:  MU  =  Member  user;  MN  =  Member  nonuser. 
Source:  Bruce  J.  Summers  [17]. 
A  study  of  the  Fifth  Federal  Reserve  District  by 
Bruce  Summers  [If]  classified  member  banks  as 
users  and  nonusers  of  system  services.  Basically, 
member  nonusers  (MK)  made  no  use  whatever  of 
FederaI  Reserve  check  clearing  services  whereas 
banks  classified  as  member  users  (MU)  cleared 
checks  “in  volume’  through  the  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of  Richmond  and  used  two  additional  services 
such  as  money  transfer,  security  safekeeping,  and 
wire  transfer  of  funds.  His  results  for  all  member 
banks  up  to  $100  million  in  deposits  are  presented 
in  Table  V. 
The  Federal  Reserve  could  approach  this  problem 
in  a  number  of  ways.  For  example,  it  could  make 
the  reserve  requirement  ratio  applicable  to  a  bank 
depend  upon  the  degree  of  utilization  of  its  services 
by  that  bank.  Banks  that  used  those  services  inten- 
sively  would  be  subject  to  correspondingly  higher 
reserve  requirement  ratios.  Although  this  would 
approximate  in form  the  arrangement  existing  in  the 
private  correspondent  market,  it  seems  impracticai 
and  difficult  to  implement. 
A  second  possibility  is  to  permit  member  banks  to 
use  some  fraction  of  their  correspondent  balances  to 
satisfy  Federal  Reserve  reserve  requirements.  To 
some  extent,  this  is  already  being  done  since  the 
required  reserves  of  a  bank  are  based  on  its  net  de- 
mand  deposits.  In  calculating  its  net  demand  de- 
posits,  a  bank  subtracts  its  balances  at  a  corre- 
spondent  from  its  total  demand  deposits.  This  is 
equivalent  to  using  a  fraction  of  its  correspondent 
balances  to  satisfy  the  reserve  requirement.  But  the 
current  “offset”  is  much  smaller  than  would  be  re- 
quired  to  equalize  the  implicit  return  on  reserves 
among  member  banks. 
Instead,  the  Federal  Reserve  has  proposed  to  sub- 
stitute  explicit  for  implicit  pricing.  By  paying  an 
explicit  rate  of  return  on  reserves  and  charging  for 
Federal  Reserve  services,  the  link  between  a member 
bank’s  utilization  of  those  services  and  the  return 
that  bank  receives  on  its  deposits  at  the  Federal 
Reserve  would  be  broken.  Simultaneously,  the  cost 
of  the  resources  used  in  the  provision  of  those  ser- 
vices  would  be  reflected  in  decisions  concerning  their 
utilization.  As  a  result,  the 
would  be  improved. 
V.  SUMMARY  AND 
allocation  of  resources 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although  the  implicit  deposit  rate  concept  can  be 
productively  used  in  a  variety  of  applications,  it  is 
subject  to  certain  limitations.  It  conceals  informa- 
tion  and,  to  some  extent,  provides  false  information. 
The  statement  that  an  explicit  rate  of  return  of  5 
percent  per  annum  is  paid  on  deposits  has  a  clear, 
unambiguous  meaning  :  the  deposit  of  an  additional 
dollar  will  generate  a  marginal  pecuniary  return  to 
its  holder  of  5  cents  per  annum-a  return  which  is 
explicit  and  not  dependent  on  the  characteristics  of 
the  individual  depositor. 
No  such  information  is  provided  by  the  assertion 
that  the  implicit  deposit  rate  is  5  percent.  Indeed, 
no  direct  marginal  pecuniary  or  nonpecuniary  return 
may  be involved  at  all.  Unless  the  additional  deposit 
enables  the  depositor  to  avail  himself  of  additional 
bank  services  at  subsidized  rates,  the  marginal  return 
is  zero  no  matter  what  the  average  return  is  calcu- 
lated  to  be. 
Moreover,  any  calculated  average  implicit  return 
can  conceal  enormous  differences  between  the  rates 
paid  to  different  depositors.  Depositors  who  make 
relatively  heavy  use  of  subsidized  services  receive  a 
correspondingly  higher  implicit  return  unless  mini- 
mum  required  deposit  levels  are  continuously  ad- 
justed  for  the  level  of  utilization  of  bank  services. 
The  fact  that  the  implicit  deposit  rate  is  not  a 
direct  market  signal  restricts  its  usefulness  for  ana- 
lytical  purposes.  For  example,  a  rise  in  bank  costs 
of  providing  payments  services  will  inflate  the  esti- 
mates  of  the  implicit  deposit  rate  as  constructed  by 
Becker  or  Gilbert  and  yet  private  decision-makers 
would  not  alter  their  behavior  unless  the  rise  in  costs 
is translated  into  a  change  in  a  market  price  such  as 
the  service  charge  rate.  Thus,  the  implicit  deposit 
rate  can  change  with  no  effect  on  behavior  and  con- 
versely.  In  response  to  these  analytica  difficulties,  a 
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count  money  by  John  Boyd  [5]  made  no  attempt 
whatever  to  define  a  single  interest  rate  as  the  rate 
of  return  on  demand  deposits.  Instead,  household 
behavior  was  related  directly  to  the  monthly  service 
charge  rate  and  the  minimum  balance  requirements 
imposed  by  banks. 
In  this  article,  several  methods  of  measuring  the 
implicit  deposit  rate  have  been  examined.  The  use 
of  the  concept  in  recent  research  on  the  demand  for 
money  has  been  explored.  In  the  process,  it  was 
shown  that  a  link  exists  between  the  form  and  effec- 
tiveness  of  price  regulation  in  the  financial  markets, 
and  the  behavior  of  the  macroeconomy.  Finally,  two 
examples  of  the  substitution  of  explicit  for  implicit 
pricing  were  discussed:  the  evolution  of  the  NOMi 
account  and  the  Federal  Reserve  Board’s  proposa:l 
for  the  payment  of  interest  on  reserves.  There  is  a 
strong  presumption  in  economic  theory  in  favor  of 
explicit  pricing.  This  presumption  applies  to  the 
relationship  between  a  commercial  bank  and  its  de- 
positors.  It  applies  with  equal  force  to  the  relation- 
ship  between  the  Federal  Reserve  and  its  member 
banks. 
References 
1.  Barr-o,  R.  J.,  and  Santomero,  A.  M.  “Household 
Money  Holdings  and  the  Demand  Deposit  Rate.” 
Journal  of  Money,  Credit  and  Banking,  (May 
1972),  pp.  397-413. 
2.  Becker,  Willian  E.  “Determinants  of  the  United 
States  Currency-Demand  Deposit  Ratio.”  Journal 
of  Finance,  (March  1975))  pp.  57-74. 
3.  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
“The  Impact  of  the  Payment  of  Interest  on  De- 
mand  Deposits.”  Staff  Study,  1977. 
4.  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
“The  Burden  of  Federal  Reserve  Membership, 
NOW  Accounts,  and  the  Payment  of  Interest  on 
Reserves.”  Staff  Study,  June  1977. 
5.  Boyd,  John  H.  “Household  Demand  for  Checking 
Account  Money.”  Journal  of  Monetary  Economics, 
(April  1976),  pp.  81-98. 
6.  Cagan,  Phillip.  Determinants  and  Effects  of 
Changes  in  the  Stock  of  Money  187'5-1960,  New 
York:  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research, 
1975. 
7.  Clark,  John  S.  “New  Study  Shows  Where  Corre- 
spondent  Banking  Stands,  Where  It’s  Headed.” 
Banking,  (November  1976). 
8.  Gilbert,  R.  A.  “Utilization  of  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  Services  by  Member  Banks:  Implications  for 
the  Costs  and  Benefits  of  Membership.”  Review, 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  St.  Louis,  (August  1977), 
pp.  2-15. 
9.  Goldberg,  L.  G.,  and  Rose,  J.  T.  “Do  State  Reserve 
Requirements  Matter. ?”  Journal  of  Bank  Research, 
(Spring  1977))  pp,  31-39. 
10.  Hess,  Alan  C.  “An  Explanation  of  Short-Run 
Fluctuations  in  the  Ratio  of  Currency  to  Demancd 
Deposits.,,  Journal  of  Money,  Credit  and  Banking, 
(August  1971))  pp.  669-678. 
11.  Hoffman,  C.,  and  Herman,  E.  “NOW  Accounts 
in  New  England.”  Studies  on  the  Payment  of 
Interest  on  Checking  Accounts.  Washington,  D.  C. : 
American  Bankers  Association,  1976,  pp.  23-38. 
12.  Johnson,  Harry  G.  “Efficiency  in  Monetary  Man- 
agement.”  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  (Sep- 
tember  1968))  pp.  971-991. 
13.  Klein,  Benjamin  J.  “Competitive  Interest  Pay- 
ments  on  Bank  Deposits  and  the  Long-Run  Demand 
for  Money.”  American  Economic  Review,  (De- 
cember  1974))  pp.  931-949. 
14.  Klein,  Michael  A.  “Deposit  Interest  Prohibition, 
Transactions  Costs,  and  Payments  Patterns:  A 
Theoretical  Analysis.” 
144-152. 
Metroeconomica,  26,  p:p. 
15.  Knight,  Robert  E.  “Comparative  Burdens  of 
Federal  Reserve  Member  and  Nonmember  Banks.” 
Monthly  Review,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Kansas 
City,  (March  1977))  pp.  13-28. 
16.  Paulus,  John  D.  “Effects  of  ‘NOW’  Accounts  on 
Costs  and  Earnings  of  Commercial  Banks  in  197,4- 
1975.”  Staff  Economic  Studies  No.  88.  Washing- 
ton:  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
System,  1976. 
17.  Summers,  Bruce  J.  “Required  Reserves,.  Corre- 
spondent  Balances  and  Cash  Asset  PosItIons  <of 
Member  and  Nonmember  Banks:  Evidence  from 
the  Fifth  Federal  Reserve  District.”  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond,  Working  Paper  78-,3, 
April  1978. 
12  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1978 